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Economists and policymakers are keenly interested in understanding the effects of social
interactions on individual behavior. One question of particular interest is how peer groups influence
the take-up of government social programs. Peer groups could serve as important information
transmission networks or be influential in changing social norms, particularly in settings where
information is scarce and perceptions are in their formative stage. Social interactions could
reinforce or offset the direct effects on take-up due to a program’s parameters, leading to a long-run
equilibrium take-up rate which is substantially lower or higher than otherwise expected.
Estimating the causal effect of social interactions has proven difficult given the well-known
problems of reflection, correlated unobservables, and endogenous group membership (Manski,
1993). On top of these identification issues, it is often challenging to define the appropriate peer
group and access data which links members of a peer group together. Early and ongoing research
attempts to control for as many group characteristics as possible or use instrumental variables.1
Recognizing that estimates could still be biased, another set of papers attempts to measure peer
effects by exploiting exogenous assignment to peer groups.2
In contrast, we focus on peer influence in naturally occurring groups and exploit variation in
the “price” of a social program for a random subset of individuals. This approach takes advantage
of the fact that treatment is randomly assigned and therefore unrelated to any other factors which
might influence take-up.3 With random variation in treatment (and group membership determined
prior to treatment), the triple threats identified by Manski no longer bias the estimates.
We estimate peer effects in the context of a social program in Norway designed to promote
gender equality. To induce fathers to become more involved in early childrearing, a reform was
passed which made fathers of children born after April 1, 1993 in Norway eligible for one month
of governmental paid paternity leave, while fathers of children born before this cutoff were not.4
Before the introduction of this program, parents had a shared leave quota which could be split
1For examples, see Bandiera and Rasul (2006), Bayer, Ross, and Topa (2008), Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan
(2000), Case and Katz (1991), Carrell, Malmstrom and West. (2008), Evans, Oates, and Schwab (1992), Gaviria and
Raphael (2001), Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996), Hensvik and Nilsson (2010), Markussen and Roed (2012),
Maurin and Moschion (2009), Monstad, Propper, and Salvanes (2011), Munshi (2003), and Rege, Telle, and Votruba
(2012).
2See, for example, Babcock, et al. (2011), Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2009, 2010), Carrell, Fullerton, and
West (2009), Carrell and Hoekstra (2010), Carrell, Hoekstra, and West (2011), Carrell, Sacerdote, and West (2011),
Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt (2006), Duncan et al. (2005), Hanushek et al. (2003), Hoxby (2000), Imberman, Kugler,
and Sacerdote (2012), Jacob (2004), Katz, Kling, and Liebman (2001), Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007), Kremer and
Levy (2008), Lefgren (2004), Ludwig, Duncan, and Hirschfield (2001), Mas and Moretti (2009), Sacerdote (2001),
Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2006), and Zimmerman (2003).
3A small but growing literature uses this empirical strategy, which Moffitt (2001) labels the “partial population”
approach. See Angelucci et al. (2010), Baird et al. (2012), Bobonis and Finan (2009), Bursztyn et al. (2012), Duflo and
Saez (2003), Hesselius, Nilsson, and Johansson (2009), Kremer and Miguel (2007), Kuhn et al. (2011), and Lalive and
Cattaneo (2009).
4Many other European countries have recently reserved a share of parental leave for fathers. For instance, in 2007
Germany introduced a two month paternity quota.
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between the mother and father. In practice, however, most mothers took the entire amount. To
encourage more fathers to take leave, the 1993 reform stipulated this extra month of paid leave
could only be taken by fathers.
We focus on whether social interactions matter for paternity leave take-up along two dimensions:
workplace networks (coworkers) and family networks (brothers). Taking advantage of the timing of
the reform, we estimate peer effects using a regression discontinuity (RD) design. There is a sharp
increase in fathers taking paternity leave immediately after the reform, from a pre-reform take up
of 3% to a post-reform take up of 35%. This quasi-random variation changed the cost of paternity
leave for some reform-window fathers and not others. However, it did not directly affect the cost of
taking leave for the father’s coworkers or brothers, since they were all eligible for paid paternity
leave when they had children in the post-reform period. Therefore, any effect on the coworker or on
the brother can be attributed to the influence of the reform-window father in their network (the peer
father), and not a change in the fundamental parameters of the leave program.
We find strong evidence for substantial peer effects in program participation in both workplace
and family networks. Coworkers are 3.5 percentage points more likely to take paternity leave if
their colleague was eligible versus not eligible for paternity leave around the reform cutoff. Since
the first-stage estimate on take up is 32 percentage points, this implies a peer effect estimate of 11
percentage points. For the family network, we find that brothers of reform-window fathers who
were eligible for leave are 4.7 percentage points more likely to take paid leave after the birth of their
first child. This implies a peer effect estimate of roughly 15 percentage points. The results for both
the family and workplace networks are statistically significant and robust to a variety of alternative
RD specifications and control variables.
We explore several possible channels for these effects. We find suggestive evidence for infor-
mation transmission about costs and benefits. In particular, our results are consistent with a model
where the information provided by peers reduces uncertainty, which in turn increases take up among
risk-averse individuals with unbiased expectations. Indeed, we find larger effects when the peer
father is a senior manager in the firm and in work environments where there is less job security.
These findings are consistent with survey data collected prior to the paternity leave reform which
suggested many fathers were reluctant to take leave because they were worried how employers and
coworkers would react.5
A key result is that the estimated peer effect gets amplified over time within a firm, with each
subsequent birth exhibiting a snowball effect in response to the original reform. The peer effect
5See Brandth and Kvande (1992) and the Norwegian government’s white papers from 1991 and 1995 on parental
leave (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 1991, 1995). The government’s 1995 white paper, referring to why many fathers
do not take paternity leave, stated “fathers are concerned that both employers and coworkers will perceive them as less
invested in their careers if they exhibit a large commitment to family.” The report further stated “one reason fathers fail
to exercise their rights may also be fear of deviating from the usual pattern in the workplace."
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cascades through the firm network as the first peer interacts with a second peer, the second peer
interacts with a third peer, and so on. The total peer effect can be decomposed into the direct
influence of the peer father and the indirect snowball effect operating through the increase in take
up of other coworkers. Although it is difficult to draw firm conclusions due to statistical uncertainty,
snowball effects seem to be important. Our baseline results indicate that snowball effects account
for over 50% of the total peer effect for the third and higher-order coworkers in a firm. Decomposing
these effects, most of the estimated peer effect can be attributed to the direct influence of the peer
father in the early years after the reform. Over time, however, the contribution of the snowball effect
dominates as the direct effect decays and more coworkers have a child within a given firm.
Taken together, our results have important implications for the peer effects literature and for the
evaluation of social programs. Both the workplace and family can serve as important networks in
settings where information is sparse and social norms are changing. This is particularly relevant for
the ongoing debate about policies aimed at promoting gender equality, ranging from family policy
to affirmative action programs. Advocates of such public interventions often argue that traditional
gender roles in both the family and labor markets can be changed or modified via peer influence.
Our study also highlights that peers can have long-lasting effects on program participation, even in
the presence of decay, since any original peer effect cascades through a network over time. This
is especially important when considering the design and implementation of new social programs,
since the initial group of participants can play a large and lasting role in the evolution of take-up
patterns.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I discusses our identification strategy.
In Sections II and III, we discuss the 1993 reform, our data, and threats to identification. Section IV
presents our main findings on peer effects and Section V explores possible mechanisms. Section VI
estimates how peer effects cascade through the workplace network. The final section offers some
concluding remarks.
I. Identification strategy
A. Using Quasi-Random Variation within Naturally Occurring Peer Groups
The objective of this paper is to estimate peer effects in naturally occurring peer groups. Instead
of randomly assigning individuals to groups and seeing how participation is affected, we exploit
quasi-random variation in the net benefit of participation for some individuals in a group and see
how other members in the group change their behavior.
To fix ideas, consider a setting with two individuals in each group g, where the price, p1g, of
program participation for individuals with the label 1 varies randomly across groups but there is no
change for any individuals with the label 2. Letting yig denote the outcome for individual i in group
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g, the system of simultaneous equations for peer effects is:6
y1g = α1+β1y2g+ γ1x1g+ τ1x2g+θ1wg+λ p1g+ e1g (1)
y2g = α2+βy1g+ γ2x2g+ τ2x1g+θ2wg+ e2g (2)
where xig are observable characteristics of individual i in group g, wg are characteristics which vary
only at the group level, and eig is an error term. This model captures the idea that individual 2’s
choice is influenced by the choice individual 1 makes, and visa versa. It also allows individual
2’s choice to depend on his own characteristics, the characteristics of individual 2, and common
group-specific variables.
Since p1g is random, it will be uncorrelated with x1g, x2g, wg, e1g, and e2g. This implies that
λ can be identified from a regression of y1g on p1g. As long as individual 2 makes their choice
after individual 1, it also means that a consistent estimate of the peer effect β can be obtained by
regressing y2g on p1g and scaling by λˆ .
The presence of an excluded variable which appears in individual 1’s outcome equation but not
individual 2’s solves the reflection problem of simultaneity. Moreover, since p1g is orthogonal to
all observed and unobserved covariates, correlated unobservables can no longer bias the estimates.
And finally, if peer groups are measured before the price shock p1g, endogenous group membership
does not create a bias either; any changes in group membership which happen after the price shock
are either a causal result of changes in p1g or orthogonal to changes in p1g.
B. Empirical Strategy
We use a fuzzy RD design to estimate the peer effects of parental leave take up. The discontinuity
we exploit arises from the introduction of the paternity quota: fathers of children born after April 1,
1993 were eligible for paid paternity leave, while fathers of children born before this cutoff were
not.
The RD design can be implemented by the following two-equation system:7
y1g = α1+1[t ≥ c](gl(t− c)+λ )+1[t < c]gr(c− t)+ e1g (3)
y2g = α2+βy1g+1[t ≥ c] fl(t− c)+1[t < c] fr(c− t)+ e2g (4)
where c is the cut-off date for eligibility to paternity leave, t is the date of birth of the peer father’s
child, and fl , fr,gl , and gr are unknown functions. The 2SLS estimate of β gives the peer effect. The
key identifying assumption of our fuzzy RD design is that individuals are unable to precisely control
6Manski’s formulation replaces the covariates xig and yig with expectations; we use Moffitt’s (2001) approach, which
is more general since it allows for e1g to affect y2g (and e2g to affect y1g).
7See Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and Lee and Lemieux (2010) for details on the implementation and assessment of
RD designs.
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the assignment variable, date of birth, near the cutoff, in which case the variation in treatment near
c is random.
We can estimate λ as the jump in take-up at the reform date cutoff in a first stage RD regression,
given by equation (3). By estimating the following reduced form model, we can examine whether
this quasi-random variation in cost of paternal leave for the peer father (assigned the label 1) changes
the leave taking behavior of the peer father’s coworker or brother (assigned the label 2):
y2g = γ2+1[t ≥ c](hl(t− c)+pi)+1[t < c]hr(c− t)+u2g (5)
where hl and hr are unknown functions, and pi can be interpreted as an “intention-to-treat” (ITT)
effect of the paternity quota on the leave taking behavior of the peer father’s coworker or brother.
An advantage of the reduced form model is that it requires fewer assumptions to estimate the
sign of the peer effect. Absent manipulation of the assignment variable and absent other changes
occuring discontinuously at the cutoff date, the reduced form consistently estimates the effect of
having a peer father exposed to the new versus old regime. To consistently estimate the size of the
peer effect via 2SLS, one also needs to assume the only channel for coworkers or brothers to be
affected is through the peer father’s take up of paternity leave. For example, a potential concern
is that program participation means something different in the pre- and post-regimes, with fathers
taking leave under the new policy sending a weaker signal to their peers about the costs of taking
leave. Two stage least squares also requires the monotonicity assumption that the reform did not
cause any fathers to be less likely to take up paternity leave.
To our knowledge, RD has not previously been used to estimate peer effects within naturally
occurring peer groups. Using an RD approach for this purpose involves a particular set of challenges
because of what might be called the “many-to-one” feature which is inherent in peer groups. By
many to one, we mean that multiple peers in a network can affect the same individual.
In an RD design, a window surrounding the cutoff (i.e., the reform date) needs to be specified,
which raises several issues in a many-to-one setting. First is how to define the running variable
when there is more than one peer father in the window, particularly when there are peer fathers both
before and after the cutoff. A second issue relates to functional form: is a coworker affected by
(i) the average number of peer fathers with children born after the cutoff, (ii) the number of peer
fathers with children born after the cutoff, or (iii) simply whether any peer father had a child after
the cutoff? A final issue is that for large networks, an RD approach will have little power; as the
number of peer fathers appearing in the reform window increases, the variation in peer exposure to
the reform decreases, since roughly an equal number of peer fathers will give birth before versus
after the cutoff. As discussed in Section II, we sidestep these issues by looking at networks where
there is a single peer father in the reform window.8
8When we tried to use multiple peer fathers within the reform window, defining the running variable as the average
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II. Background and Data
A. Paternity Leave
Governmental paid parental leave has a long history in Norway.9 In 1977, parents were granted 18
weeks of paid leave. During the 1980s and 1990s, the leave period gradually expanded, and by 2011
there was a maximum of 47 weeks of paid leave. The parental leave mandates offer employment
protection and income replacement. Apart from a few weeks reserved for the mother, parents could
share the leave between them as desired before 1993, but few fathers took any amount of leave.
In an effort to promote gender equality, in October 1992 the labor party introduced a paternal-
leave taking quota in their proposed national budget for 1993. The reform was passed in parliament
in December 1992 and implemented on April 1, 1993. The key feature of the paternal quota was
that four out of 42 weeks of paid parental leave were reserved exclusively for the father.10 Apart
from exclusive quotas of four weeks for fathers and the pre-existing nine weeks for mothers, parents
could share the parental leave between them as they desired, with the restriction that mothers and
fathers could not both take leave at the same time.
While paid maternity leave was only contingent on the mother working at least 6 of the last
10 months before birth, paid paternity leave was contingent on both parents (whether married or
cohabiting) working at least 6 of the last 10 months. Both the father’s and mother’s earnings in the
prior 10 months needed to exceed the “substantial gainful activity” threshold (approximately NOK
72,900 in the year 2010 or $12,500). Income payments were based on the earnings of the person on
leave, but a father’s payment was reduced proportionally if the mother did not work full-time. In
families with full-time working mothers prior to childbirth, the parental leave scheme offers 100%
income compensation, subject to a capped amount, for both men and women. The income cap is
non-binding for most parents, and when it is exceeded, most public and private employers top up
benefits so that income is fully compensated.11 The firm is not allowed to dismiss the worker for
taking leave, and the parent has the right to return to a comparable job.
The parental leave system is universal, simple, and well-known (including details about eligi-
bility, benefit amounts, and the application process). To apply for parental leave benefits, parents
must inform their employers and submit a joint application to a Social Security Administration field
office at least six weeks before the pregnancy due date. For each spouse, the family must specify
birth date and using the fraction of births born after the cutoff, there was not even a significant first stage.
9Our description builds on Rege and Solli (2010) and Cools, Fiva and Kirkeboen (2011).
10At the same time as the four-week paternity quota was implemented, the leave amount that could be shared between
parents was extended by three weeks. We believe the paternity quota is the driving force behind the increased fraction
of fathers taking leave, as none of the previous extensions of shared parental leave increased father’s leave take-up.
11In 2010, benefits were capped at NOK 437,400 (approximately $75,000). Thirty-four percent of fathers and 7%
of mothers earned more than the benefits cap. Parents could also choose 80% income replacement and receive an
additional 6 weeks leave.
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Figure 1. Paternity leave take up by quarter of year for all eligible fathers, 1992-2006.
days of leave and when the leave period will start and end.
Because almost all eligible women take leave and the family must specify maternity and
paternity leave on the same form, the introduction of the paternal-leave taking quota had few
practical implications for the application process. The key change was that more families filled in
non-zero days of paternity leave on the application form.
The introduction of the paternity quota led to a large increase in take-up rates of parental leave
by fathers, as shown in Figure 1. While only 3% of fathers took leave prior to the reform, the
take-up rate jumped to approximately 35% in 1993 after the reform was implemented. The take-up
rate continued to rise over the next decade, climbing to 70% of eligible fathers by 2006.
B. Data and Sample Restrictions
Our analysis employs several data sources that we can link through unique identifiers for each
individual. The data on parental leave comes from social security registers that contain complete
records for all individuals from 1992 to 2006. We link this data with administrative registers
provided by Statistics Norway, a rich longitudinal database that covers every resident from 1967
to 2006. For each year, it contains individual demographic information and unique identifiers that
allow us to match spouses and parents to their children. We further merge these data sets with linked
employer-employee data that contains complete records of all firms and workers for the period 1992
to 2006.
For both coworker and brother networks, we restrict the sample to fathers predicted to be eligible
in order to gain precision. Since we do not observe months of work, we predict eligibility based on
earnings in the year prior to childbirth; we count a father as eligible if both the father’s and mother’s
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annual earnings exceed the substantial gainful activity level described in the previous subsection.12
We further refine the sample to allow us to cleanly identify a single peer father and use a
straightforward RD design, as discussed in Section I.B. For the family network, we include fathers
with a child born of any parity within one year of the reform, who have brothers whose first child is
born after the peer father’s child and after the reform. For the workplace network, we restrict the
sample to firms which have only one birth of any parity to male employees in the one-year interval
straddling the reform (six months on each side) and coworkers whose first child is born after the
peer father’s child and the reform. The tighter sample window for firms reflects that fact that we
have a larger sample of coworkers in our data.
One implication of our approach is that the estimation sample will be comprised of small- and
medium-sized Norwegian firms (measured at the plant level). The median firm size for workers in
our restricted sample is 27 employees, while the median firm size for all workers in Norway is 58
employees. These small and medium firms are ideally suited for a study of peer effects, because it
is likely that employees in these types of firms interact with each other directly.
In Online Appendix Table A1, we document the characteristics of fathers in each of our networks.
Our coworker sample contains approximately 20% of the entire population of eligible fathers, while
our brother sample contains 13%. There is little overlap in the two networks; 4% of coworkers are
brothers and 9% of brothers are coworkers in our two samples.
III. Threats to Identification
The validity of our RD design requires that individuals cannot manipulate the assignment variable,
which is the birthdate of the peer father’s child. There is little opportunity to strategically time
conception, as the implementation date for the reform was announced less than nine months in
advance. However, it is still possible that mothers with due dates close to the cutoff date could
postpone induced births and planned cesarean sections.13 As shown in Online Appendix Table A2,
there is some evidence that a small number of births are delayed (10 fewer births the week before
the reform for all of Norway, relative to an average of 840 births per week). To avoid the possibility
that some births in our sample are strategically delayed, our baseline RD results exclude the week
immediately before and the week immediately following the reform date of April 1, 1993. As we
will show, using a wider donut of 2 weeks on each side of the reform, or no donut at all, does not
materially affect our findings.
Another threat to our identification strategy is that the announcement of the reform could cause
a change in eligibility among peer fathers around the cutoff date. Given the timing of the reform,
12Average take-up for predicted eligible fathers is 60% over the entire post-reform period, while it is only 4% for
predicted non-eligible fathers.
13See e.g. Dickert, Conlin, and Chandra (1999).
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there is little opportunity for eligibility manipulation. An RD regression in Online Appendix Table
A3 confirms there is no significant jump in predicted eligibility of peer fathers around the cut-off
date.
If families time date of birth or change eligibility status in response to the reform, then we would
expect to see changes in the distribution of pre-determined characteristics of the parents around the
reform date of April 1, 1993. In Online Appendix Table A3, we test whether parental characteristics
change at the time of the 1993 reform. It is reassuring to find that all the RD estimates with these
characteristics as dependent variables are close to zero and insignificant.
Our analysis estimates peer effects in the take up of paternity leave, conditional on coworkers
or brothers having children after the reform. It is possible that having a peer father exposed to the
reform could also affect the fertility behavior of coworkers and brothers. However, as illustrated in
Online Appendix Figure A1, there is no measurable effect on the fertility of coworkers or brothers
of peer fathers.14
IV. Peer Effect Results
A. Graphical Results
A virtue of the RD design is that it provides a transparent way of showing how the peer effects
are identified. To this end, we begin with a graphical depiction before turning to a more detailed
regression-based analysis.
 
Figure 2. Fraction of peer fathers taking leave.
Notes: Each observation is the average number of peer fathers taking paternity leave in one-week bins (left panel) or
two-week bins (right panel), based on the birthdate of their child. Dashed vertical lines denote the reform cutoff of
April 1, 1993 (normalized to 0).
14A formal statistical test, mirroring the RD regression specification of Table 1, yields an ITT estimate for fertility of
-.004 (s.e.=0.10) for coworkers and -.001 (s.e.=.014) for brothers.
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Figure 2 displays the fraction of peer fathers (i.e., reform-window fathers) taking any amount of
paid leave in a window surrounding the reform, for both the workplace and family networks. In
both graphs, the running variable, child’s date of birth, has been normalized so that April 1, 1993 is
time zero. For the workplace network, each observation is the average number of peer fathers taking
paternity leave in one-week bins, based on the birthdate of their child. For the family network, we
use unrestricted means for two-week bins since we have fewer observations.15 For both networks,
there is a sharp jump in the take-up rate of peer fathers at the cutoff, with program participation
rising from roughly 3% to 35%. These graphs provide strong evidence that the reform had large
direct effects on the leave behavior of peer fathers.
 
Figure 3. Coworker’s and brother’s leave take up.
Notes: Each observation is the average number of coworkers taking paternity leave in one-week bins (left panel) or
brothers taking paternity leave in two-week bins (right panel), based on the birthdate of the peer father’s child. Dashed
vertical lines denote the reform cutoff of April 1, 1993 (normalized to 0). Each graph sets the scale of the y-axis to ±.3
standard deviations of the respective variable.
Figure 3 illustrates the reduced form model. In each graph, we plot unrestricted averages in one-
or two-week bins and include estimated regression lines using separate linear trends on each side of
the cutoff date. Whereas the regression lines better illustrate the trends in the data and the size of
the jumps at the cutoff dates, the unrestricted means indicate the underlying noise in the data.
The left panel of Figure 3 plots coworker’s leave take up as a function of the birthdate of their
peer father’s child around the reform window in one-week bins. The jump at the cutoff is the ITT
estimate. As a reminder, these coworkers are all eligible for the extra 4 weeks of exclusive paternity
leave since they have their first child after the reform has been implemented. The difference is that
some coworkers had peer fathers who were not eligible for 4 extra weeks (those observations to the
left of 0 in the graphs) while other coworkers had peer fathers who were eligible (those observations
15There are 242 brothers (with 233 peer fathers) and 550 coworkers (with 153 peer fathers) on average in a one-week
interval.
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to the right of 0). The right panel of Figure 3 presents a similar graph for the family network, with
data aggregated into two-week bins since there are fewer observations. The panels reveal a sharp
jump in leave take up of a coworker or a brother if their peer father had his child immediately after,
versus immediately before, the reform date of April 1, 1993.16
In our appendix, we provide further visual evidence for a sizable reduced form peer effect in
both the workplace and family networks. Online Appendix Figure A2 presents graphs similar
to Figure 3, but aggregating the raw data into bigger bins. In Online Appendix Figure A3, we
present local linear regression graphs for coworker’s and brother’s leave take up. Both figures reveal
similarly-sized jumps at the cutoff.
B. Regression Results
Having shown the raw patterns of leave taking behavior around the reform cutoff, we now turn to
regression-based estimates. Table 1 presents the baseline RD estimates for the peer effects of fathers
on their male coworkers and brothers. The specifications use daily data, exclude observations in
a one-week window on either side of the discontinuity, include separate linear trends in birth day
on each side of the discontinuity, and employ triangular weights. To gain precision, we include
pre-determined control variables for father’s and mother’s years of education, father’s and mother’s
age and age squared at birth, parent’s county of residence and marital status prior to the birth, and
an indicator for the gender of the child.
Column 1 of Table 1 estimates the first stages and corresponds to Figure 2. For both the
workplace and family network, the estimate is a little over 30 percentage points. This is a sizable
direct effect on paternity leave, with an increase in take-up from roughly 3% to 35%.
The second column of Table 1 reports the reduced form (ITT) estimates corresponding to Figure
3. Panel A shows that coworkers are 3.5 percentage points more likely to take paternity leave if their
colleague was eligible versus ineligible for paternity leave around the reform cutoff. To convert
this into an estimated peer effect, we divide the reduced form coefficient in column 2 by the first
stage coefficient in column 1. This yields a second stage estimate of 11.0 percentage points. This
estimated peer effect is large relative to the average take-up rate of 67% for coworkers of untreated
fathers. In Panel B, we find strong evidence for peer effects among brothers as well. Brothers of
reform-window fathers who were eligible for leave are 4.7 percentage points more likely to take
paid leave after the birth of their first child. This implies a peer effect estimate of 15.3 percentage
points. This represents a substantial increase in take up given the average take-up rate is 57% for
16There is a negative slope as a function of the running variable, both before and after the cutoff. This negative slope
reflects the sample restriction that coworkers and brothers have their children after their peer father and after the reform
cutoff, which affects when coworkers and brothers have children during our sample period. It does not create a problem
for consistency, since the effect is continuous through the cutoff.
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Table 1. Regression discontinuity estimates for peer effects of fathers on their coworkers and
brothers.
Reduced form Second stage
First stage (ITT) (2SLS) N
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Workplace network
Take up of leave .317*** .035*** .110*** 26,851
(.026) (.013) (.043)
[.03] [.67] [.67]
B. Family network
Take up of leave .304*** .047** .153** 12,495
(.014) (.020) (.065)
[.026] [.57] [.57]
Notes: Specifications use daily data, exclude observations in a one-week window on either side of the discontinuity,
include separate linear trends in birth day on each side of the discontinuity, and employ triangular weights. Control
variables include father’s and mother’s years of education, father’s and mother’s age and age squared at birth, parent’s
county of residence and marital status prior to the birth, and an indicator for the gender of the child. Standard errors
clustered by firm in panel A and by family in panel B. Comparison mean in brackets. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
brothers of untreated fathers.17
The peer effect estimates presented in this section represent a weighted average of the peer
effects for coworkers or brothers having children at different points in time. Coworkers and brothers
having children later in the sample period could experience smaller effects if the the direct effect
of the peer father decays over time. But the effect could also grow over time if the original peer
father’s influence gets amplified with each subsequent birth in a firm. We explore these issues in
more detail in Section VI.
C. Robustness Checks
In this section we probe the stability of our baseline estimates to alternative specifications. We
conclude that our estimated peer effects are remarkably robust to the usual specification checks
performed in RD studies.
In Online Appendix Table A4, we first exclude all control variables from the regressions, and
find virtually no change in the estimates for either the workplace or family networks. This is to
be expected, since the values of pre-determined covariates should not affect the estimated jump
at the cutoff date in a valid RD design. Results are also essentially unchanged if we do not use
triangular weights. We next explore what happens when we use separate quadratic or cubic trends
17The average take-up rate is higher for coworkers compared to brothers since take up increases over time and
brothers have their children earlier in our sample period.
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on each side of the discontinuity, rather than separate linear trends. The estimated reduced form
and second stage coefficients are slightly larger, although the cubic trend estimate is no longer
significant for the workplace results. The next set of robustness checks estimate RD regressions
without a one-week donut around the reform date and with a two-week donut, respectively. The
results remain significant, and if anything, get somewhat larger the bigger the donut. We also try a
specification which includes all of the predicted non-eligible fathers, which yields similar results
compared to our baseline estimates. Finally, note that we have been clustering our standard errors at
the firm level or the family level. An alternative is to cluster at the level of the running variable,
which is the day of birth. This alternative clustering does little to the standard errors.
We perform a variety of additional robustness checks. Online Appendix Table A5 varies the
window size of our baseline specification. For the workplace network, in panel A we find that
windows of 3 months, 4.5 months, and 6 months (our baseline) yield similar results which all remain
statistically significant. The estimates using a smaller window are somewhat larger, but also have
larger standard errors. A similar set of findings holds in panel B for the family network. Since we
have fewer brothers compared to coworkers, we use wider windows of 6 months, 9 months, and 12
months (our baseline) in panel B. As with the workplace network, estimates for the brother sample
using a smaller window are somewhat larger, with larger standard errors, but remain statistically
significant.
An alternative approach to using polynomials on each side of the reform cutoff is to use local
linear regression. This estimation method may be more robust to trends away from the cutoff point.
In Online Appendix Table A6, we estimate local linear regressions for the workplace and family
networks with bandwidths of varying size, including the optimal bandwidth indicated by Imbens
and Kalyanaraman (2012). Regardless of bandwidth choice, the estimates are robust and statistically
significant for both the workplace and family networks.
As a final check, we run a series of placebo tests. To do this, we first assign a window around a
false reform date, and then use the RD approach described in Section I.B to estimate a reduced form
peer effect. We run 730 placebo tests for each network (2 years of estimates), where each estimate
increases the false reform date by one day. To avoid having these placebo estimates be influenced
by any jump at the true cutoff, the placebo windows start after the true reform date of April 1, 1993.
Online Appendix Figure A4 graphs the distribution of placebo estimates for both the workplace
and family network. As the graphs make clear, the true peer effect (from Table 1) is more extreme
than all of the placebo estimates for brothers and almost all of the placebo estimates for coworkers.
These findings indicate the odds of finding peer effects as large as we do merely due to chance are
small.
13
D. Peer Effects in Other Networks
Is there any evidence for peer effects in networks where ties are weaker? To answer this question, in
Table 2 we estimate whether a peer father influences his brother-in-law. This tie is arguably weaker
than between brothers both in duration and intensity. We find no evidence of any peer effect in this
weaker family network; the estimated peer effect is close to zero and statistically different from the
effect found for brothers in Table 1 (p-value = .09).
Table 2. Peer effects in networks with weaker ties.
First stage Reduced form Second stage N
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Brothers-in-law
Take up of leave .320*** -.004 -.013 8,876
(.017) (.023) (.072)
[.043] [.54] [.54]
B. Neighbors
Take up of leave .274*** .002 .008 38,550
(.012) (.012) (.043)
[.03] [.58] [.58]
Notes: Brother-in-law defined as the husband of a sister to the peer father. Neighbor defined by taking the two closest
households on each side of the peer father. Specifications mirror those in Table 1. Standard errors clustered by family
in panel A and by neighborhood in panel B. Comparison mean in brackets. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
The second panel in Table 2 defines peer groups by geographical neighborhoods. Using street
addresses, we define the two closest households (prior to the reform) on each side of a father as
neighbors. Similar to before, we limit the sample to “neighborhoods” where there is one birth in a
one year window surrounding the reform. We then look at first births to neighbors who had children
after the reform and after the peer father.
Interestingly, neighbors defined in this way exert no peer influence on each other for paternity
take up. The positive peer effects found for coworkers and brothers in Table 1 are statistically
different from the neighbor estimates (p-value of .06 when compared to coworkers and p-value of
.04 when compared to brothers). This result holds even if we define neighborhoods more broadly;
we find similar results using the four closest households or the entire street. Apparently, in this
setting, neighbors are not important peers. When interpreting this evidence, however, it is important
to draw a distinction between neighborhoods and neighbors; neighborhoods include an entire
vector of attributes, of which neighbors are just one element. So our finding does not mean that
neighborhoods play no role in people’s decisions, but rather that neighbors defined strictly by close
geography seem to have little influence on program participation.
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V. Mechanisms
A. Other Consequences of the Paternity Leave Reform
In Online Appendix Table A7, we estimate the impact of the paternity leave reform on several
outcomes of the peer fathers as well as their spouses and children. These estimates are useful in
understanding not only whether there are other direct effects of the reform on the peer father and his
family besides increased take up, but also as background for understanding the type of information
likely to be transmitted among peers about the costs and benefits of taking paternity leave.18
As documented in Online Appendix Table A7, we find no evidence of a statistically significant
discontinuity in the future employment and earnings of fathers or mothers, or in the relative
employment and earnings of mothers versus fathers. There is also no evidence of a direct effect
on completed fertility, long-term marital status, or the grade point average of the child in middle
school. The only estimate which approaches statistical significance is father’s total earnings, but the
estimated effect is small, amounting to less than a 2% reduction in earnings. The lack of other direct
effects suggests that while the paternity leave quota may have encouraged fathers to stay home with
their infants in the short run, it did not have other long-lasting effects. In particular, the reform did
not achieve the goal of improving gender equality more broadly in the workplace.
B. Peer Effect Channels
There are several channels through which a peer father could affect the leave taking behavior of
his coworker or brother. The first is sharing of information about how to enroll in the program. As
discussed in Section II.A, the parental leave system is universal, simple, and well-known. Because
almost all eligible women take leave and the family must specify maternity and paternity leave
on the same form, the introduction of the paternal-leave taking quota had few, if any, practical
implications for the application process. For these reasons, we do not think a key mechanism for
the estimated peer effects is information about either the existence of the program or how to sign
up. This is supported by previous research suggesting that fathers’ leave taking behavior were not
constrained by lack of information about eligibility, benefit amounts, and the application process
(Brandth and Kvande, 1992; NOU, 1995).
The second possible channel is leisure complementarities or direct consumption externalities.
Since the births are temporally distant, coworkers and brothers do not take leave at the same time
as the original peer father. As a consequence, there is limited scope for complementarities or
18There is a substantial literature evaluating the impact of maternity and paternity leave reforms on parental and child
outcomes. Our estimates are broadly consistent with Rege and Solli (2010) and Cools, Fiva and Kirkeboen (2011).
Using difference-in-differences approaches (and a different sample), these two studies evaluate the direct effects of the
Norwegian paternity leave reform.
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externalities arising from the reform-induced take up of paternity leave. Another piece of evidence
against this channel is that the peer effect is present even if brothers live in different municipalities.19
The third channel is information about the costs and benefits of participation. In our setting of
paternity leave, information about the consequences of taking paternity leave is initially scarce, since
prior to the 1993 reform very few fathers were taking leave. At the same time, survey data collected
prior to the paternity leave reform suggested many fathers were reluctant to take leave because they
were worried how employers and coworkers would react (see footnote 5). The reform generates
random variation in the take up of peer fathers and therefore changed the information set of a
subgroup of brothers and coworkers. This exogenous increase in information reduces uncertainty,
which should increase take-up among risk averse individuals with unbiased expectations.20
Without data on subjective expectations and individual information sets, it is difficult to assess
what type of information transmission is driving the estimated peer effects. However, we expect
(i) a worker’s boss to transmit more valuable information and (ii) workers in more uncertain work
environments to react more strongly to increased information from a peer.
We first examine whether the informational value about the firm specific consequences of taking
leave is likely to be higher if the peer father is a senior manager in the firm. Since we do not
have information about the management hierarchy within the firm, we assume managers are the
employees with the first or second highest wage in the firm. Panel A of Table 3 reveals the estimated
peer effect is over two and a half times larger if the peer father is predicted to be a manager in the
firm as opposed to a regular coworker.
We next compare leave take up by type of firm. For workers with high job security, the benefit
of learning about a peer father’s leave-taking experience should be less valuable, as they do not
need to worry as much about an employer reacting badly to paternity leave. In Table 3, we examine
whether this is true. Consistent with the job security hypothesis, in panel A the estimated peer
effects are twice as large in low unionization workplaces. We find a similar pattern of estimates for
private sector jobs versus relatively secure public sector jobs. We also break up firms based on the
average tenure of workers within a firm. In approximately 25% of firms where average tenure is 10
years or more, the estimated peer effect is close to zero. In contrast, for less established firms with
higher worker turnover, the peer effect is large and statistically significant. Taken together, these
firm-type results suggest the benefit of workplace-specific information is more valuable in settings
where there is more job uncertainty.21
19The estimated peer effect is .134 (s.e.=.89) for brothers who live in the same municipality, and .170 (s.e.=.094) for
brothers who live in different municipalities.
20An alternative is that fathers tend to overestimate the costs of taking paternity leave. Other explanations in social
psychology include imitation and herding behavior.
21In Online Appendix Table A8, we explore additional dimensions of heterogeneity. We find larger, but noisily
estimated, peer effects in smaller firms and for coworkers who start at the firm in the same year.
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Table 3. Mechanisms in the workplace network.
Reduced Second
Characteristic of First stage form stage N
Peer father (1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Separate Regressions
1. Predicted manager .311*** .072** .233** 4,272
(.049) (.031) (.103)
Not predicted manager .316*** .028* .088* 22,579
(.029) (.015) (.047)
2. Low unionization (≤33%) .358*** .079*** .219*** 6,834
(.034) (.026) (.074)
High unionization (>33%) .306*** .036** .117** 16,225
(.028) (.017) (.055)
3. Private firm .301*** .051*** .170*** 17,977
(.027) (.016) (.055)
Public firm .377*** .032 .084 5,076
(.041) (.029) (.077)
4. Low tenure firm (<10 yrs) .307*** .045*** .148** 20,128
(.030) (.016) (.053)
High tenure firm (≥10 yrs) .328*** .009 .029 6,723
(.051) (.025) (.075)
B. Combined Regression Contrasts [p-values]
1. Manager vs. not manager [.08] 26,851
2. Low vs. high unionization [.36]
3. Private vs. public [.22]
4. Low vs. high tenure [.03]
Notes: Specifications mirror those in Table 1. Peer father predicted to be a manager if he is the first or second highest
earner in the firm. Unionization defined at the industry level. Firm tenure type defined by the average tenure of workers
in the firm. Sample size can vary across subgroups due to missing values. Standard errors clustered by firm in panel A
and by family in panel B. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
Since the estimates for each row in panel A come from a separate subsample, they are often
imprecise. To gain precision, we also estimate an alternative specification using a single combined
regression. In this regression, the subsamples have a common first stage and common slopes for the
linear trends in birth day (one common trend before and one common trend after the discontinuity).
Because of perfect multicolinearity,22 we cannot identify eight separate peer effects. But we can
estimate whether the four key contrasts (manager vs. not manager, low vs. high union, private
vs. public and low vs. high tenure) are statistically significant. Panel B reveals the manager vs.
not manager and the low vs. high tenure firm contrasts are statistically significant while the other
22Because manager + not manager = low union + high union = private + public = low tenure + high tenure = 1, the
set of these eight groupings interacted with the reform cutoff dummy has only five degrees of freedom.
17
two contrasts are not. A joint test on all four contrasts has an F-statistic of 3.11 with an associated
p-value of .01.23
VI. Snowball Effects
A. Model
Peers can play an important role in the evolution of program participation, because peer effects
cascade through a network as the first peer interacts with a second peer, the second peer interacts
with a third peer, and so on. The following diagram illustrates how peer effects could travel through
a network. The direct effects of the peer father on his coworkers are captured by the bottom arrows
in the diagram. The indirect, or snowball effects, are captured by any path from the peer father that
travels through the top arrows in the diagram.
reform peer father coworker 2 coworker 3 coworker 4
This causal chain is initiated by the direct effect of the reform, inducing peer fathers (coworker
1) of children born after April 1, 1993 to take up paternity leave. The second link in the chain is the
first subsequent coworker to have a child (coworker 2); his leave behavior is influenced directly by
the (reform-induced increase in) leave taking of the peer father. The third link is coworker 3 who
has a child after coworkers 1 and 2: the direct influence of the peer father is now amplified by a
snowball effect due to the (peer-father-induced increase in) take up of coworker 2. The causal chain
continues in this fashion, such that the direct influence of the peer father on a coworker is amplified
by a snowball effect operating through the intervening coworkers.
We model the causal chain by the following system of equations:
y1g = α+λ p1g (6)
y2g = α1+β11y1g (7)
y3g = α2+β22y2g+β12y1g (8)
y4g = α3+β33y3g+β23y2g+β13y1g (9)
where the price, p1g, of program participation for the peer father (with subscript label 1) varies
randomly across firms (denoted by g), and coworkers are sorted by birth order so that coworker
23If we do not restrict the combined regression to have common slopes for the linear trends in birth day, the low
versus high tenure contrast remains significant at the 10% level and the joint test for all four contrasts has a p-value of
.17.
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j is the jth father in the firm that has a birth. The model makes two key assumptions: sequential
ordering of peers and additive separability. The assumption of sequential ordering implies that
fathers who already have births influence fathers who subsequently have births, and not the other
way around. Additive separability implies that, except for the ordering of births within a firm, peer
effects from coworkers do not have an interactive effect.
B. Identification
To identify the snowball effects we additionally assume β11 = β12 = β13 = β1 and β22 = β23 = β2
(for consistency in notation, we also relabel β33 as β3). This parameterization of six coefficients
down to three implies the peer effect of the first coworker and the peer effect of the second coworker
is the same for all subsequent coworkers. Importantly, however, the assumption allows for different
peer effects from the first, second, and third birth in a firm. If fathers are primarily learning about
how an employer will respond to paternity leave, this formulation makes sense: the first coworker
to take leave is likely to reveal more novel information and therefore be a more influential peer than
the second or third coworker to take leave.
With these assumptions, random variation in p1g can be used to identify a set of reduced
form coefficients pi2 = dy2/d p1g = β1λ , pi3 = dy3/d p1g = (β2β1 +β1)λ , and pi4 = dy4/d p1g =
(β3β2β1+β3β1+β2β1+β1)λ . The total peer effect on the take-up of coworker j is given by pi j
divided by the first stage coefficient λ . By comparing the estimated pi’s across coworkers, we can
identify the snowball effects. The second coworker identifies the direct effect, β1, as pi2 divided by
λ . Subtracting off this direct effect, the snowball effect on the third coworker, β2β1, is given by
pi3−pi2 divided by λ ; the snowball effect on the third coworker, (β3β2β1+β3β1+β2β1), is given
by pi4−pi2 divided by λ . The percent of the total peer effect accounted for by the snowball effect
for coworker j can then be calculated as (pi j−pi2)/pi j.
The model in equations (6)-(9) is related to the one-sided feedback model of peer effects in
Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (2003). Their model also assumes sequential ordering and
additive separability. Their model differs in that they reduce the set of six β coefficients to two
parameters; their model assumes β11 = β22 = β33 = γ , β12 = β23 = γδ , and β13 = γδ 2. While
this parameterization is useful for some applications, it is less suited to our setting as it would
imply the most recent birth in a firm has the largest peer effect. In part because of the differing
parameterizations, our concept of the snowball effect is related, but not identical, to Glaeser,
Sacerdore and Scheinkman’s social multiplier.
So far, our model implicitly assumes the direct and indirect peer effects are independent of when
the coworker’s child is born in time. In reality, the influence of a peer is likely to decay over time,
with smaller peer effects for coworkers having children temporally distant from one another. If
values of the decay parameters were known, the estimates could be adjusted accordingly, but since
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they are not we adopt a calibration-type approach. To obtain a benchmark level of decay, we exploit
the fact that coworker 2 does not experience a snowball effect as there are no intermediate births in
between him and the peer father (coworker 1). Hence, any change over time in the estimated peer
effect for coworker 2 can be attributed to decay. We assume the decay between any two coworkers
due to birth spacing is the same as the decay identified between coworker 2 and coworker 1. Decay
adjusted estimates for coworker j can then be calculated by dividing pi j by 1+ r j, where r j is the
percent decay for a given birth spacing. We examine robustness by considering different amounts of
decay relative to the benchmark.
C. Empirical Results
Table 4 displays the decay adjusted reduced form peer effects (pi j/(1+ r j)) for each coworker in a
firm. Note the first stage coefficient λ is the same for all coworkers, and therefore does not affect
the relative size of the snowball effect compared to either the direct or total peer effect. With this
note in mind, we proceed by using the decay adjusted reduced form estimates to decompose the
total peer effect into the direct effect and the snowball effect, and graph the relative importance of
these effects over time.
Table 4. Snowball effects on coworkers within a firm.
Reduced Percent Reduced Percent Reduced Percent
form snowball form snowball form snowball
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. No decay B. Cubic decay C. Quartic decay
Coworker 2 .033** 0% .026** 0% .024** 0%
pi2/(1+ r2) (.017) (.013) (.012)
Coworker 3 .039** 15 % .037** 30% .034** 29%
pi3/(1+ r3) (.017) (.017) (.015)
Coworker 4 .049*** 33 % .060*** 57% .055*** 56%
pi4/(1+ r4) (.018) (.022) (.020)
Coworker 5+ .025 -32 % .083 69% .077 69%
pi5/(1+ r5) (.016) (.053) (.049)
Snowball F-test 1.01 2.84 2.84
p-value [.387] [.036] [.037]
Notes: Sample includes all coworkers having a child before 2002. The reduced form peer effects are adjusted for
decay as indicated in the specification headings. Snowball columns indicate the amount of the peer effect that can be
attributed to the snowball effect. The F-test for no snowball effects is a joint test of pi5/(1+ r5) = pi4/(1+ r4) =
pi3/(1+ r3) = pi2/(1+ r2). N = 22,922. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
The first column presents coworker estimates which do not account for decay (i.e., r j=0 for
all coworker groups). This regression mirrors our baseline specification, but allows for a separate
20
discontinuity for each coworker. Even without subtracting out decay, the total reduced-form peer
effect increases in magnitude from coworkers 2 through 4. Because we do not have enough
observations to separately estimate effects within the firm for fifth and later coworkers, we estimate
the average peer effect for this group. The reduced form peer effect for this later group declines,
which is not surprising if decay is sizable.
Details on how we obtain the benchmark amount of decay are found in Online Appendix B.
Here we merely report, for each order coworker j, the average decay rate, r j, and average birth
spacing relative to the original peer father, s j.24 There is appreciation for coworker groups 2 and 3
(r2=.27, s2=2.6 years; r3=.04, s3=3.6 years), and depreciation for higher order coworkers in a firm
(r4=-.18, s4=4.3 years; and r5=-.71, s5=5.6 years). This pattern makes sense once one realizes that
although fathers generally sign up for leave before the birth of their child, most fathers do not begin
their 4 weeks of leave until approximately 9 to 11 months after their child’s birth. While there is
likely to be some immediate information transmission (e.g., coworker 2 knows early on that the
peer father has signed up for leave), more information is revealed after the peer father returns to
work. At that point, not only does the peer father have first-hand experience taking leave, but there
is also an opportunity in the ensuing months to observe how the employer treats the peer father after
his return to work.25
Our key results are reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4, which report decay-adjusted estimates
allowing for cubic depreciation. The decay adjusted reduced form coefficient for coworker group
2 is estimated to be .026. This coefficient represents only the direct influence of the peer father
on coworker 2, since there are no intermediate coworkers to create a snowball effect. It is smaller
compared to the estimate in column 1, since on average, coworker 2’s have their children early on
when there is still appreciation. For coworker group 3, the decay adjusted reduced form peer effect
is .037, with the snowball effect accounting for 30% of the total peer effect. Since there are more
intervening coworkers, the snowball effect is even larger for coworker group 4 (57% of the total
peer effect) and coworker group 5+ (69% of the total peer effect), although the effect for the latter
group is imprecisely estimated. The difference in the decay adjusted estimates for coworker 2 versus
coworker 4 has a p-value of .056 for cubic decay and .049 for quartic decay. As the table documents
with the “Snowball F-test,” these decay-adjusted snowball effects are jointly significantly different
from each other.
As a robustness check, we also tried modeling benchmark decay as a fourth order polynomial.
As seen in columns 5 and 6, this makes little difference to the estimates. Since the decay function is
24A possible concern is that birth spacing between a coworker and the peer father is directly affected by the reform.
In Online Appendix Figure A5, we show this is unlikely to bias the estimates.
25The interval between the peer father and subsequent fathers giving birth in a network is also likely to vary
systematically with firm characteristics (such as the size of the firm), in which case our estimates of decay will also
include this type of heterogeneity.
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estimated using the relatively small sample of coworker 2’s, we perform a calibration-type sensitivity
analysis instead of directly accounting for the sampling variability of the decay estimates in our
snowball tests.26 Specifically, we explore the sensitivity of the joint snowball tests to differing
amounts of depreciation. In Online Appendix B, we plot what the decay function would look like
if it were three-fourths or half as large as the one we actually use. Using these flattened decay
functions still results in joint significance for the snowball effects; the three-quarters decay function
yields a p-value of .051 and the halved decay function yields a p-value of .104. Steeper decay
functions than the one we actually use would increase statistical significance.
D. Importance of Snowball Effects
Figure 4 illustrates the relative importance of the direct peer effect and the snowball effect over
time. The top line in the graph shows the actual leave take up for all coworkers having children
after the original peer father. The bottom line subtracts the estimated reduced form peer effect from
the total leave take up.27 The difference between the upper and lower lines illustrates how much
lower leave take up would have been in each year had the original peer father not influenced any of
his coworkers, either directly or indirectly. This counterfactual gap, which includes depreciation, is
sizable and actually gets slightly larger over time.
The shading in Figure 4 decomposes this counterfactual gap into the direct effect of the peer
father on coworkers (dark grey) and the indirect snowball effect (light grey) over time. In 1993,
virtually all of the estimated effect can be attributed to the direct effect, as there is little opportunity
for intervening births to create a snowball effect. However, over time, the direct effect which can be
mapped back to the original peer father decays. In contrast, the snowball effect grows and starts to
dominate over time as more coworkers have a child within a given firm.
Figure 4 illustrates how important early peers are for future take up of social programs. From
1993 to 1999, program participation went from a little over 50% to over 70% of eligible coworkers.
Much of this increase is due to common time effects, such as changes in societal norms, and the
influence of other peer groups not captured by our estimates. However, even six years after the
implementation of the program, the peer effects which can be traced back to the original father
account for 21% of the total increase in program participation relative to 1993. These findings are
especially important for the rollout of new social programs, as they indicate that participation rates
early on can have long-lasting effects on future participation.
26Decay is estimated noisily enough that directly accounting for its sampling variability would make the coefficients
in Table 4 insignificant.
27To construct the bottom line, we use the estimated pi j’s (the reduced form estimates not adjusted for decay) to
predict the size of the peer effect originating from the peer father (coworker 1), accounting for the mix of births in each
year (coworker 2, 3, 4, and 5+ births). We only plot the period from 1993 to 1999; extrapolating past 1999 is noisy and
implies depreciation in excess of 100%. Most coworkers in our dataset have their children before 1999.
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 Figure 4. Direct peer and snowball effects over time.
Notes: The top line in the graph shows the actual leave take up for all coworkers having children after the original
peer father. The bottom line subtracts the estimated total peer effect originating from the peer father. The grey shading
decomposes the gap into direct peer and snowball effects.
VII. Conclusion
We find strong evidence for substantial peer effects in program participation in both workplace and
family networks. Coworkers and brothers are 3.5 and 4.7 percentage points, respectively, more
likely to take paternity leave if their peer father was eligible versus not eligible for paternity leave
around the reform cutoff. These estimates imply sizable peer effects of 11 and 15 percentage points
for coworkers and brothers. The most likely mechanism is information transmission about costs and
benefits, including increased knowledge of how an employer will react. The estimated peer effect
gets amplified over time within a firm, with each subsequent birth exhibiting a snowball effect in
response to the original reform.
Taken together, our results have important implications for the peer effects literature and for
the evaluation of social programs. Our peer effect estimates point out that both the workplace and
family can serve as important networks in settings where information is scarce and perceptions
are in their formative stage. Peer effects may be of particular importance in the ongoing debate
about policies aimed at promoting gender equality, ranging from family policy to affirmative action
programs. Although the snowball analysis requires stronger assumptions and the standard errors
may be understated, it highlights that peer influences can have long-lasting effects on program
participation, even in the presence of decay, since any original peer effect cascades through a
network over time. This is especially important when considering the design and implementation of
new social programs, since the initial group of participants can play a large and lasting role in take-up
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patterns. Social interactions can reinforce the direct effects due to a program’s parameters, leading
to a long-run equilibrium take-up rate which can be substantially higher than would otherwise be
expected.
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